Webb University Boiling Springs, NC Term Paper INTELLIGENCE IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR AND THE EFFECTS OF THE ESPIONAGE SYSTEM ON THE WAR Lauren E. Caulder HIS 318-C Fall 2011 Espionage at the commencement of the American Civil War was not an organized system; however the war necessitated the development of more structured intelligence systems for both the Union and the Confederacy. By the middle of the war the dimensions of the espionage system had augmented significantly.
Thus espionage came to play a critically important role that affected general’s decisions in both the North and the South, ultimately affecting the outcome of the Civil War as a whole. Throughout this research the development of intelligence organizations, the role of individual spies, Union espionage successes and failures and Confederate espionage successes and failures will be examined. It is important to understand that there is not enough recorded evidence to prove that intelligence in the American Civil War had an extreme impact on the outcome of the war.
Nevertheless, as studied in the latter part of this research, the work of espionage operatives certainly did prove to be imperative to the decisions of generals in individual battles. The course that these battles took, often due to intelligence information, was what would eventually impact the course of the war. Until 1884, the United States differed from most civilized nations in that it had no organized espionage agency. Any attempts at espionage development until this point can be described as “unorganized, event-driven, and sporadic at best. Spying activities were implemented, in a limited extent, in the Revolutionary and Mexican Wars, but were virtually nonexistent from the end of the Mexican War until the Civil War began. Initially, both the Yankees and the Rebels approached the task of acquiring intelligence in their own way. During this time, each general typically acquired their own means for gathering intelligence. For example, Lafayette Baker directed intelligence operations for Lieutenant General Winfield Scott, Commander-In-Chief of the U. S. army.
Union General Pope, on the other hand, handled his intelligence gathering with cavalry and charging his subordinates to send out spies in the field. Even President Lincoln contracted a personal intelligence agent who provided him with direct information. Each private spy agency was so self-regulating, as well as competitive, that agents were known to have kept close surveillance and even arrested rivals. When Major General George McClellan became commander of the Army of the Potomac, he enlisted Allan Pinkerton, the best-known Civil War spy, to preside over his intelligence unit.
Pinkerton’s Washington-based intelligence agency became the first American Army intelligence department. Pinkerton’s services were rendered only to General McClellan, not the entire Union Army, and he had limited orders from General McClellan that allowed only espionage and interrogation. McClellan received communication from other sources directly. The agency set up by Pinkerton and McClellan was a major advancement in military intelligence as it provided a more structured, formal entity. The intelligence Pinkerton supplied proved to be essential in the early years of the war.
However, Pinkerton’s information was often difficult to digest because of the vast reports he often generated; for example, “a twenty-page report of trivia from the interrogation of a refugee or single enemy soldier. ” Pinkerton has also been held accountable for overestimating Confederate figures in reports to General McClellan, which resulted in military failures from being over cautious. After McClellan’s Army experienced several defeats, he was replaced by General Burnside, who dismissed Pinkerton’s agency and appointed Lafayette Baker as his intelligence officer.
Despite Pinkerton’s downfalls, his successes led to advanced methods of recruiting local civilians to be employed as spies rather than depending solely on trained agents. In fact, Pinkerton’s agency and espionage tactics formed the basis for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The Bureau of Military Information (BMI), founded by General Hooker in 1863, was directed by George Sharpe. A vast collection of reports from the BMI were discovered at the National Archives in 1959 by Edwin Fishel.
These reports disclosed that, in contrast to Pinkerton’s system, Sharpe’s unit used a host of sources in gathering intelligence, including cavalry, spies, balloonists, Signal Corps observers, scouts, and interrogations of prisoners and deserters. By merging the information gathered from all of his sources, Sharpe was able to provide Hooker with a comprehensive description of enemy standing. General Grant, who initially placed minimal importance upon intelligence gathering, came to view intelligence as a vital tool and depended upon Sharpe’s reports and the activity of the BMI to provide him with secret information.
In fact, “the BMI became an integral part of Grant’s successful campaign to neutralize the Shenandoah Valley and to stretch Lee’s manpower to the brink of collapse. ” Confederate espionage definitely had the advantage at the outbreak of the war. By early 1861, the Rebels had already established a spy ring in the Yankee political and military capital, Washington, D. C. The Confederacy benefitted largely from its numerous individual operatives. Though the South made efforts to establish a regulated intelligence department such as the Confederate Signal Core, they never succeeded in achieving efficiency.
In fact by the end of the war the confederacy was still debating between proposals for creating a structured intelligence program. In 1862, the Confederacy organized its first secret service agency, a division of the Confederate States of America (CSA) Signal Corps, appointing Major William Norris as chief. Norris was instrumental in coordinating the efforts of numerous spies and counterespionage agents active in the region between Richmond and Washington, a key factor in developing sophisticated intelligence communications.
The bureau developed to such an extent as to extend its espionage network north of the Mason-Dixon Line and even into Canada. Indeed, Norris’s unit came to be one of the most successful intelligence establishments in the Civil War, equaled only by the Union’s Bureau of Military Information. Some of the achievements of the bureau include leading reconnaissance activities along the Potomac, conducting agents to scouting posts, and communicating dispatches from the Confederate State departments.
In addition to Norris’s agency, a second Confederate intelligence organization was established in 1864, a branch of the Torpedo Bureau. This agency was smaller, inadequately managed, and never attained the sophistication of Norris’s unit. In conclusion, though progress was made, neither the Union nor the Confederacy acquired completely efficient intelligence means. Although large-scale espionage endeavors were often unsuccessful, individual spies made astounding discoveries throughout the war. These individual operatives were often driven by strong emotions, patriotism and fervent loyalty.
Since neither the Union nor the Confederacy had structured intelligence agencies at the beginning of the American Civil War, individual spies came to play a crucial role in gathering intelligence during the war. These spies ranged from classifications such as Caucasian males and females to African-American males and females. The individual contributions of spies and the effects of their gathered intelligence will be examined in greater detail in the latter part of this research. Many male spies of the Confederacy and the Union had several common characteristics.
Many of the spies were lawyers, who generally became spymasters, others were actors, yet many were untrained and uneducated but had innovative minds and prodigious natural intelligence. Many others saw their position as being their opportunity to contribute to “the cause of their government” be it the Union or the Confederacy. One commonality between all, however, was the enjoyment in the challenge which came with the position of a spy and all male spies seemed to have been courageous and willing to risk their own lives to carry out their mission.
Not only were male spies involved in the American Civil War, but women spies also played a significant role in intelligence gathering in the North and the South. These women had some interestingly staunch characteristics and unique qualities. Many of the women were dedicated to contributing to the “cause of their government” and often times the women were even more committed to this cause than were the men. For the most part the female spies were not well-educated, with the exception of nurses, but simply joined the underground as their only way to actively contribute to their government’s war effort.
Many of the female spies disguised themselves as men and assumed the role of their male counter-parts in front line warfare in order to gain direct intelligence. Interestingly, some of the female spies were married to men who fought for the opposing side; these men did not know their wives were involved in such subversive activities. Finally, all women spies had one thing in common; it was the idea of gaining social recognition through their labor. They desired to be recognized as intelligent and talented as were the males.
Often less considered are the African-American spies in the Civil War who, understandably, spied for the Union only. The African-Americans who were chosen for spying were well-educated slaves who had run away to seek refuge in the North. Not much is known about these spies as they did not care to gain prestige from their accomplishments; they merely desired to settle down and have ordinary and peaceful lives in the North at the close of the war. The dramatic embellishment of Confederate scouts and Southern lady spies in popular history has portrayed Confederate intelligence as superior to its Union counterpart.
However, according to Fishel, in comparing the respective espionage efforts in a factual manner, the Union intelligence agency was more productive than the Confederates in all aspects except for the cavalry division, where Confederates had the advantage. Much of the success of Northern espionage can be attributed to their agents’ ability to blend in with enemy troops undercover. The Federals especially surpassed the Rebel’s in the flag-signal interception, bookkeeping of intelligence gatherings, and ultimately in scouting behind enemy lines. The North enjoyed considerable victories as a result of intelligence gathering.
Time and time again it can be noted that individual operatives provided generals with intelligence information which in turn caused the generals to devise their movements and strategies in a way which could undermine or surprise the enemy. One of the greatest examples of Union espionage victories occurred during the Second Bull Run Campaign. General Pope received vital intelligence gathered by a spy, Thomas O. Harter, who had penetrated enemy lines and traveled with Confederate forces from Richmond. Harter, who led espionage activities for General Sigel, was the first to learn of General Lee’s plan for a surprise attack on Pope’s forces.
Another spy, Richard Montgomery, provided further intelligence that both confirmed and supplemented Harter’s information. General Pope was made aware of the intelligence in time to devise a plan of escape, which was successful. General McDowell, who was an eyewitness of this event, stated that “The information induced Major General Pope to order his own army to retreat immediately behind the Rappahannock. ” According to Fishel, Harter’s intelligence discovery and delivery “may well be the timeliest single product of espionage received by any Union commander during the entire war. Another espionage victory that occurred in the Second Bull Run Campaign can be credited to General Pope’s persistent cavalry reconnaissance. This intelligence force discovered General Lee’s attempt to outmaneuver Federal forces along the Rapidan and Rappahanock rivers. Upon receiving this intelligence, General Pope constructed his battle plans in a way which thwarted Lee’s strategy for winning the Campaign. Pope’s plans were carried out successfully and thus intelligence had again saved the Union. Another astounding feat of espionage tactics took place in the Chancellorsville Campaign.
Around the time of this campaign Confederate spies had cracked the Union’s flag code; upon learning of this, Union agents intentionally sent a false signal message directing a cavalry raid. Confederates intercepted this message and General Lee acted upon it, sending General Stuart to meet the nonexistent Federal cavalry attack. General Hooker then advanced his troops to the enemy’s rear through the region evacuated by General Stuart’s forces. Union espionage was especially vital in the Gettysburg Campaign. Indeed, Federal espionage efforts are credited with alerting Union generals of enemy movements that initiated the Gettysburg Campaign.
The next victory was made possible through the efforts of a group of soldier-spies who penetrated Rebel encampments in the Shenandoah Valley, spending four days gathering intelligence. This expedition provided the Union with the advantage of knowing the placement of General Lee’s main forces. Another strategic advantage gained from intelligence in the Gettysburg Campaign can be attributed to the dispersion of local citizen-scout groups across south-central Pennsylvania who provided indispensable information on Rebel force positions.
In addition to capturing several Rebel couriers, cavalry scouting made the impressive discovery of the Confederate advancement to Gettysburg. Because the structure of Lee’s army had been accurately determined by intelligence operatives throughout the campaign, by investigating hundreds of prisoners, intelligence officers were able to determine that only four of the enemy’s brigades were still intact after two days of the battle. This information prompted the Union to decide against General Meade’s plan to relocate his force to Maryland.
These examples verify that espionage did play a crucial role in determining Union generals’ courses of action. In each of these incidents, it is important to note the significance of the timely conveyance of intelligence reports as well as the level of confidence each general decided to place upon the information he received. In some cases, Union failures resulted due to untimely transmission or disregard for intelligence findings. Although the Union can be credited with much success as a result of their better intelligence, they also met with defeat at times.
However, this defeat was not always a result of inaccurate intelligence gatherings but rather the general’s refusal to recognize and consider the information which they had been given. In fact, there are no Confederate errors which can be compared with the two times the Union generals refused to consider intelligence reports. There were indeed disastrous outcomes which could have been avoided if the generals would have utilized their intelligence information. In the first Bull Run Campaign, Union intelligence provided a vital piece of information—confederate troops were departing Shenandoah Valley for Manassas.
This information was essential because General McDowell knew his army could not defeat both the Manassas Army and the Valley Army. However, the federals wasted their opportunity to act on this information resulting in McDowell receiving the intelligence too late to alter his plans. Although this battle ended in defeat for the Union Army, it demonstrated the opportunities intelligence provided. This incident also emphasizes that the efficacy of intelligence depends upon its prompt delivery into the right hands. In the Peninsula Campaign, Pinkerton and his agents correctly identified all of General Lee’s 178 regiments.
Pinkerton operatives “gathered the location, character, and strength of their (enemy) fortifications. ” However, in attempting to satisfy McClellan’s idea of enemy capabilities, he may have purposefully exaggerated enemy figures in his reports to McClellan. This numbers game cost the Union greatly and resulted in the administration ordering the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula and the failure of McClellan’s campaign. This is an example of the detriment incurred when an intelligence agent is influenced by outside forces instead of giving the strictly sound facts.
In another instance, General McClellan disregarded intelligence reports, gathered by balloonists, of the Confederate evacuation in Manassas. This blunder allowed the Rebels to escape unharmed. One of the most serious mistreatments of valuable intelligence occurred before the Battle of Chancellorsville. Though several witnesses, including pickets, scouts, cavalrymen, signalmen, and even an officer, reported the assembly of General Jackson’s forces on the Union’s right wing, Federal headquarters amazingly denied the reports believing instead that the Confederates were retreating.
As a final attempt to alert Union generals, Major Rice sent a note to federal headquarters stating: “A large body of the enemy is massing in my front. For God’s sake, make disposition to receive him! ” Despite the urgency of this message “this news was tauntingly rejected at corps headquarters. ” In the Antietam Campaign, McClellan again made two irreversible strategic mistakes due to his inadequate treatment of intelligence findings. The astounding intelligence discovery of General Lee’s Antietam Campaign plan, the “Lost Order,” which the Union found wrapped around cigars, granted McClellan a major advantage.
The orders provided McClellan with strategic information about the enemy’s exact position and agenda. However, McClellan delayed implementing a plan of action for sixteen hours. In this situation it was important that McClellan make quick use of his time, which he characteristically failed to do, and again missed his opportunity due to procrastination. In addition, McClellan relied so strictly on the order that he dismissed additional intelligence reports of enemy advances simply because they conflicted with Lee’s Lost Order. His rejection of this crucial information caused him to make erroneous decisions in positioning his army.
Yet another case in which a general disregarded intelligence material occurred in the Battle of Fredericksburg. General Burnside, in defiance of accurate intelligence information regarding enemy placement, implemented a battle strategy that forwarded his main raid against the Rebel’s most fortified forces. The result was a tragedy—the Union suffered the loss of about 12,500 men while the Confederacy lost about 5,300 men. The two most devastating blows out of those examined above resulted from the Union’s disregard for intelligence originating from two eyewitness accounts.
Both the account of Johnston’s army evacuating the Shenandoah Valley and Jackson’s preparation for attack at Chancellorsville dealt fatal blows to the Federals. Almost as serious was McClellan’s rejection of reports that Confederate troops had evacuated Manassas, which afforded Johnston a stolen march. Though the Union had a more sophisticated intelligence program which could have prevented the serious blunders analyzed above, devastating consequences still occurred. This reveals the necessity for not only accurate intelligence, but also expedient delivery and proper evaluation of the given information.
As previously mentioned, Union espionage successes and failures both exceed those of the Confederates. However this disparity can be partly attributed to the lack of surviving Confederate intelligence records. Despite this lack, the scope and accuracy of Confederate general’s intelligence information can be gathered from existing telegrams and letters and there is still enough of this evidence to verify that Confederate intelligence was indeed inferior to that of the Union. Yet the Confederacy must still be credited for their superiority in cavalry reconnaissance and individual scouting.
Individual operatives also played an important role in intelligence gathering for the Confederacy. Rose Greenhow is an example of an individual spy who made one of the greatest Confederate espionage discoveries of the war, aiding in the Confederate victory in the First Bull Run Campaign, the first major battle of the American Civil War. Perhaps the intelligence Greenhow provided “helped turn an insurrection into the bloodiest conflict in American history. ” It is striking to imagine that a war may not have ever transpired had the Confederates lost the initial battle.
This proves the potential magnitude of intelligence. Mrs. Greenhow, a socialite and lobbyist, frequently hosted many high ranking politicians in her Washington home. When the Civil War broke out, Captain Thomas Jordan called on Greenhow to form a spy ring in the Federal capital. Rose Greenhow took advantage of her social position to glean secret information for the Confederacy which she “at once communicated with pride and pleasure to General Beauregard, then commanding the Confederate forces near Washington. In July, 1861, Greenhow relayed two messages to General Beauregard notifying him of the Union’s decision to advance south for a raid on Confederate headquarters in Manassas. The messages were received in time to allow General Johnston to transport his Shenandoah Valley army to Manassas undetected by the Union. In addition, the Confederate Signal Corps detected Union repositioning in sufficient time to allow Confederate troops to take up defensive positions. The battle ended in disaster for the Union, which lost 3,000 soldiers to the Confederate’s 2,000.
Confederate intelligence saw its greatest accomplishment in its accurate determination of top secret Union plans to establish a naval base in Port Royal, South Carolina. When the Federals gathered at Annapolis and Hampton Roads to prepare for the voyage, the captains were given sealed orders containing the mission’s secret destination. In order to maintain confidentiality, the commanders did not decide on the destination until after they set sail. However, an anonymous spy gained knowledge about these plans and reported to Rebels leaders three days before the expedition arrived at its destination.
Confederate commanders received a telegram from the Secretary of War, Judah Benjamin, stating “I have just received information, which I consider entirely reliable, that the enemy’s expedition is intended for Port Royal. ” Confederate commanders responded by calling in a four vessel flotilla in addition to land forces. However, due to lack of naval resources Confederates were not able to maintain the blockade. Although, the end of this Port Royal event was a Union success, it is important to realize that this was a major breakthrough in Confederate espionage.
Another great Confederate advance was made possible through espionage efforts of scouts in Jackson’s Valley Campaign. Informed by intelligence operatives of a vulnerable flank in the Union’s Valley Army, General Jackson articulated a battle plan which entailed pushing the enemy across the Potomac. Jackson’s plan was so effective that his army was able to catch their opponents by surprise. In this encounter the confederate forces largely outnumbered the Union forces; consequently the Union army was unable to sustain the struggle in the field and withdrew to Western Virginia.
The Confederacy can attribute their success in the Battle of Front Royal to the accurate intelligence provided by Rebel spy Belle Boyd. Upon gathering intelligence regarding the Unions plan to encircle Jackson’s forces as well as taking him captive, Boyd travelled fifteen miles to Jackson’s headquarters to transmit her discovery. Boyd also provided intelligence about enemy strength, location, and defense resources of the Union in the Shenandoah Valley Campaign. As a result of Boyd discovery Jackson was able to alter his plans and consequently overcome the Federals. In her journal, Belle Boyd transcribes a letter she received from General
Jackson in appreciation for her services: Miss Belle Boyd: I thank you for myself and for the army, for the immense service that you have rendered your country today. Hastily, I am your friend, T. J. Jackson, CSA In the Peninsula Campaign, General Stuart profited greatly from the intelligence gathered by his cavalry division. By circling General McClellan’s army, the cavalry secured indispensable information detailing enemy positions. General Lee used this intelligence to organize his attack which initiated the Seven Days battles. In addition, General Stuart employed his cavalry espionage force in the Second Bull Run Campaign.
This time, the cavalry invaded General Pope’s army from behind, meanwhile seizing telegrams which disclosed the movement of McClellan’s forces from the Peninsula to Bull Run Creek. Yet another success that can be accredited to Stuart’s cavalry is their detection of unfortified positions in the Union’s right wing during the Battle of Chancellorsville. This information led to General Jackson’s raid in which he targeted and swiftly conquered the identified vulnerable areas. In contrast to the Union’s frequent procrastination and rejection of quality intelligence, in most instances the Confederate acted upon information once they received it.
The Confederate were at a disadvantage however, because they simply did not have as sophisticated intelligence or resources as the Union had. In perspective, the Confederates typically made use of the intelligence means which they had but this inferiority also led to several failures throughout the war. Since a vast amount of information is not known about events in which Confederate intelligence failed to provide accurate information for the Confederacy, what has been better recorded are the failures of the Confederacy due to espionage operative’s failure to obtain intelligence.
Another obstacle General Lee encountered was the unfocused actions of his intelligence scouts who often found pursuing Yankee soldiers more adventurous and entertaining than gathering information. There were several incidents during the Civil War in which generals were caught by surprise or were not aware of enemy movements because of inadequate intelligence. For example, in the Peninsula Campaign Confederates failed to detect the infiltration of Federal soldiers at the base of the peninsula for three weeks and thus the Union was able to establish a firm presence in this area.
By the time the Confederates reached the peninsula to engage in battle they were outnumbered and suffered defeat with the loss of 6,000 men in addition to Confederate commander General Joseph E. Johnston being wounded during the Battle of Seven Pines. Had the Confederate intelligence detected that the Union forces were building up their defense in the Peninsula the generals could have acted before the Union had time to concentrate a large number of forces. Similarly, in the Fredericksburg Campaign Union General Burnside’s movement was difficult for General E.
Lee to interpret. This maneuver was not hidden, thus Confederate intelligence should have been able to detect the route and destination which Burnside was planning to move his forces. Instead the intelligence and the government provided Lee with conflicting reports leading him to become puzzled. Because of this, Lee “ended by accepting everything as equally credible and equally incredible. ” It was not until a week after Burnsides arrival in Fredericksburg that Lee concluded that Burnside planned to transport the Army of the Potomac into the area.
Lee’s uncertainty led to a delay in recruiting Jackson’s force to Fredericksburg. In the Confederate march to Pennsylvania during the Gettysburg Campaign, General Lee was unaware of enemy positions for a week. Even upon approaching Gettysburg where he planned to concentrate his forces he had no intelligence information revealing that the Federals had previously arrived. Consequently, upon General Lee’s arrival to Pennsylvania he was caught off guard by the presence of the Union and never recovered from this setback.
The Union prevailed in capturing the more favorable ground of Gettysburg which led to their subsequent victory in the Battle of Gettysburg. Throughout the American Civil War the work of individual espionage operatives and intelligence agencies changed the course of several individual battles and ultimately, as the above evidence corroborates, the war at large. Individual Union and Confederate operatives, who acted independently of intelligence organizations, provided crucial knowledge of enemy positions and plans to their generals thus making way for them to formulate their battle strategies accordingly.
As the war progressed, the evolvement of more structured intelligence organizations came to be vital to the survival of the North and can be credited to have saved the South time and time again. Without the contributions of the espionage labor force in both the Union and the Confederacy, the Civil War may have taken a completely different turn. One may never know to what extent intelligence gathering impacted the course or the outcome of the war; however, it is certain that espionage is indispensable and within this system lies the power to save and to defeat. Bibliography Primary Sources:
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Heather Wagner, Spies in the Civil War (New York: Chelsea House, 2009), 40. [ 14 ]. Ibid. , 45. [ 15 ]. Fishel, The Secret War for the Union, 2. [ 16 ]. Wagner, Spies in the Civil War, 44. [ 17 ]. Ibid. , 45. [ 18 ]. Ibid. [ 19 ]. Ibid. [ 20 ]. Fishel, The Secret War for the Union, xii. [ 21 ]. Ibid. , xiv. [ 22 ]. Ibid. , 3. [ 23 ]. William C. Feis, Grant’s Secret Service: The Intelligence War from Belmont to Appomattox (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 268. [ 24 ]. Ibid. [ 25 ]. Markle, Spies ; Spymasters of the Civil War, xvii. [ 26 ]. Hagemen, Espionage in the Civil War, Signal Corps Association, http://www. civilwarsignals. rg/pages/spy/spy. html. [ 27 ]. Ibid. [ 28 ]. Ibid. [ 29 ]. Ibid. [ 30 ]. Ibid. [ 31 ]. Ibid. [ 32 ]. Ibid. [ 33 ]. Ibid. [ 34 ]. Markle, Spies ; Spymasters of the Civil War, 97. [ 35 ]. Grenville M. Dodge and George H. Sharpe, Grant’s Intelligence Chiefs in West and East, Signal Corps Association, http://www. civilwarsignals. org/pages/spy/pages/grantintel. html. [ 36 ]. Allen, Intelligence in the American Civil War, 96. [ 37 ]. Ibid. [ 38 ]. Ibid. [ 39 ]. Ibid. [ 40 ]. Ibid. [ 41 ]. Ibid. , 97. [ 42 ]. Ibid. [ 43 ]. Ibid. , 96. [ 44 ]. Ibid. , 97. [ 45 ]. Ibid. [ 46 ]. Ibid. , 96. [ 47 ]. Fishel, The Secret War for the Union, 5. [ 48 ].
Ibid. [ 49 ]. Ibid. [ 50 ]. Ibid. , 568. [ 51 ]. Ibid. [ 52 ]. Ibid. , 564. [ 53 ]. Ibid. , 182-199. [ 54 ]. Ibid. [ 55 ]. Ibid. [ 56 ]. Ibid. , 192. [ 57 ]. Ibid. , 193. [ 58 ]. Ibid. , 564. [ 59 ]. Ibid. , 182-210. [ 60 ]. Ibid. , 210. [ 61 ]. Ibid. , 340-359. [ 62 ]. Ibid. , 564. [ 63 ]. Ibid. , 412-432. [ 64 ]. Ibid. , 565. [ 65 ]. Ibid. , 412-432. [ 66 ]. Ibid. , 484-504. [ 67 ]. Ibid. , 505-537. [ 68 ]. Ibid. , 565. [ 69 ]. Ibid. , 505-537. [ 70 ]. Feis, Grant’s Secret Service, 216, 251. [ 71 ]. Fishel, The Secret War for the Union, 568. [ 72 ]. Feis, Grant’s Secret Service, 240. [ 73 ]. Fishel, The Secret War for the Union, 29-52. 74 ]. Ibid. [ 75 ]. Ibid. [ 76 ]. Ibid. , 564 [ 77 ]. Allen Pinkerton. The Spy of Rebellion: Being a True History of the Spy System of the Unites States Army During the Late Rebellion. Lexington: Forgotten Books, 1886. [ 78 ]. Fishel, The Secret War for the Union, 129. [ 79 ]. Ibid. , 162. [ 80 ]. Ibid. , 566. [ 81 ]. Ibid. [ 82 ]. Ibid. , 386-411. [ 83 ]. Ibid. , 399 [ 84 ]. Ibid. [ 85 ]. Terry L. Jones, The American Civil War (New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. , 2010), 163. [ 86 ]. Ibid. [ 87 ]. Ibid. [ 88 ]. Fishel, The Secret War for the Union, 211-240. [ 89 ]. Ibid. , 566. [ 90 ]. Ibid. , 250-274. [ 91 ].
Jones, The American Civil War, 176. [ 92 ]. Fishel, The Secret War for the Union, 568. [ 93 ]. Ibid. [ 94 ]. Ibid. [ 95 ]. Ibid. , 567. [ 96 ]. Ibid. , 568. [ 97 ]. Ibid. [ 98 ]. Ibid. [ 99 ]. Rose O’Neale Greenhow, My Imprisonment and the First Year of Abolition Rule at Washington: 1863, http://docsouth. unc. edu/fpn/greenhow/greenhow. html (accessed October 26, 2011). [ 100 ]. Ann Blackman, Wild Rose: Rose O’Neale Greenhow, Civil War Spy (New York: Random House, Inc. , 2005), x. [ 101 ]. Ibid. [ 102 ]. Ibid. , 182 [ 103 ]. Rose O’Neale Greenhow, My Imprisonment and the First Year of Abolition Rule at Washington: 1863, http://docsouth. nc. edu/fpn/greenhow/greenhow. html. [ 104 ]. Blackman, Wild Rose: Rose O’Neale Greenhow, Civil War Spy, 182-183. [ 105 ]. Ibid. [ 106 ]. Fishel, The Secret War for the Union, 564. [ 107 ]. Jones, The American Civil War, 69. [ 108 ]. Fishel, The Secret War for the Union, 563. [ 109 ]. Ibid. , 53-76. [ 110 ]. Ibid. [ 111 ]. Ibid. , 71. [ 112 ]. Ibid. , 53-76. [ 113 ]. Ibid. [ 114 ]. Ibid. , 165-181. [ 115 ]. Ibid, 181. [ 116 ]. Markle, Spies & Spymasters of the Civil War, 156. [ 117 ]. Ibid. [ 118 ]. Fishel, The Secret War for the Union, 175. [ 119 ].
Belle Boyd, In Camp and Prison, Volume I, www. docsouth. unc. edu/fmpn/boyd1/boyd1. html (accessed October 26, 2011). [ 120 ]. Fishel, The Secret War for the Union, 564. [ 121 ]. Ibid. , 130-164. [ 122 ]. Ibid. , 564. [ 123 ]. Ibid. , 182-210. [ 124 ]. Ibid. , 387-411. [ 125 ]. Ibid. [ 126 ]. Ibid. , 568. [ 127 ]. Ibid. [ 128 ]. Ibid. , 566. [ 129 ]. Jones, The American Civil War, 168. [ 130 ]. Fishel, The Secret War for the Union, 566. [ 131 ]. Ibid. , 250-261. [ 132 ]. Ibid. [ 133 ]. Ibid. , 257. [ 134 ]. Ibid. , 566. [ 135 ]. Ibid. , 519-537. [ 136 ]. Ibid. ;Jones, The American Civil War, 354.