Arthur Andersen ‘s audit of Enron has been the most noteworthy failure of hearer independency, but it was by no agencies the first, the largest, or the last. The Enron audit was the 4th major audit failure impacting Andersen since 1999. At one clip, Enron was the 7th largest house in grosss in the United States and was extremely touted as being an advanced seller in natural gas and electricity. ( Chaney, P. K. , 2002 )
After Enron ‘s ( October 16, 2002 ) third-quarter net incomes proclamation, Andersen ‘s independency from Enron began to be questioned because the audit house had provided important non-audit services to Enron in add-on to its fees associated with the Enron audit. Andersen received $ 47.5 million in fees from Enron. Of this sum, $ 34.2 million, or 72 % , was audit related and revenue enhancement work. Entire fees for other services totaled $ 13.3 million. Besides, Enron had outsourced some internal audit funcitons to Andersen. For this information, Enron has come under review for potentially fly-by-night direction and a clear deficiency of independent fiscal monitoring. Furthermore, U.S. regulators found that the company ‘s hearer, Arthur Andersen, conspired to conceal accurate accounting informations from the populace. ( Chaney, P. K. , 2002 )
Independence requires that these audits be carried out without prejudice or subjectiveness. Simply stated, hearers are required to be independent from and unbiased by their clients ‘ involvements. Outside hearers are hired to supply an independent, external sentiment that can attest the truthfulness of a house ‘s ain fiscal studies. If it were non for the claim of independency, there would be no ground for outside hearers to be, as their map would be excess with those of a house ‘s inside hearers. The confidence of independency is important to all of those who rely on audited fiscal statements for dependable information sing a house ‘s fiscal wellness, including investors, loaners, employees, and strategic spouses. ( Sean M. O’Connor, 2004 )
Accounting houses by and large have inducements to avoid giving “ bad intelligence ” to the directors who hire them and pay their auditing fees, non to advert their extremely profitable consulting fees. The nature of this hearer mistake has three systematic causes. First, the hearer can perpetrate fraud by wittingly publishing a more favourable audit study than is warranted. This may happen when the hearer accepts a payoff or bows to client force per unit area or menaces. Furthermore, the hearer can be unduly influenced by holding a direct or indirect fiscal involvement in the client. Last, the hearer can be unduly influenced because of holding some personal relationship with the client beyond what is expected in a normal audit between independent parties.
To keep independency, hearers have to follow professional behavior and moral moralss which require hearers to guarantee they do non execute direction maps or do direction determination is relevant with their client houses. This seems to connote that the audit performs a consultancy map which conflicts slightly with the thought of auditor independency. The value of scrutinizing depends to a great extent on the populace ‘s perceptual experience of the independency of hearers. It is non surprising that independency is the first topic addressed in the regulations of professional behavior. Independence is a important construct that sets hearers apart from the accounting profession, as their nucleus mission is to attest the public studies that describe companies ‘ fiscal position. By showing an sentiment, the independent hearer assumes a public responsibility. The map of “ public watchdog ” demands that the hearer subordinates duty towards the client in order to keep complete fidelity to the public trust. The hazard in the deficiency of independency is that the stockholder as a category who reads and relies upon the fiscal statements upon which the hearer has rendered an sentiment to its hurt has a cause of action against the hearer. To function such a category of individuals an hearer needs to take an indifferent point of view when executing audit trials, measuring the consequences therein, and publishing an audit study and sentiment with regard to fiscal statements. ( Moore, D. A, 2004 )
In another point of position, the grosss generated from confer withing may be sufficiently big to act upon the hearer ‘s judgement sing questionable accounting policies. In other words, the menace of the hearer going excessively closely that is involved with the involvements of the managers, particularly if jobs arise with the Inland Revenue. It could be argued that this menace is mitigated if different forces are involved in executing the personal revenue enhancement work.