It is regularly asked whether if there are any dissimilarity between the perspective of Gazprom as well as the Russian government. Since the Russian government has a controlling concern in the company, however, directly or indirectly, it appoints as well as approves all major personnel appointments, some have an opinion that Gazprom serves as an economic as well as political arm of the government. This dispute showed that Gazprom and the Russia government working together, more so, with the company taking its crucial direction from the Russian president Putin, likely with the tacit accord of President Medvedev who only sporadically issued articulations. In this manner, while President Putin was in charge of Russian decision-making during the crisis in January 2006, Putin was also clearly in control in January 2009 (Pravda report, 2009).
LIKELIHOOD OF A MAJOR CRISIS
The likelihood of a noteworthy crisis in Crimea is small yet at the same time conceivable. There should have been one in 2008 had the Ukrainian naval force deployed to enforce Yushchenko’s announcement that BSF warships which had involved in operations off Georgia not be permitted to return back to Sevastopol. The probability of the crisis likely diminishes as the end of the president Yushchenko term approaches. Polls show that Yushchenko has basically no chance of winning reelection. Despite whether the next president is Tymoshenko, Yanukovych, or previous rada speaker Arseniy Yatseniuk, Ukraine is probably going to seek after modest pace in building its relations with NATO, a more measured tone on help for Georgia, as well as more direct relations with Russia. That apparently would bring down Moscow’s interest in any crisis regarding Crimea (Pilfer, S. 2009).
Russia–Ukraine crisis in 2009 was a historic event in Russian gas relations with Commonwealth Independent Soviet Union countries as well as Europe; for Europe, it was also a landmark gas as well as energy security event which will presumably have far-reaching policy results. However, crisis in Russia–Ukraine mutual gas relations was not in itself an amazement. Many, including ourselves, had seen it coming long ago in the summer of 2008. The astonishment, indeed the blow, was that the two sides enabled the dispute to escalate from disagreements about debts, costs, and transit levies to the point where supplies to Europe were completely cut off; and after that enabled this situation to proceed for two weeks in the middle of winter, with genuine antagonistic humanitarian outcomes for especially south-east European nations.