Rachels everyone (people in all places and

calls his theory “Morality Without Hubris” and gives it two dimensions, where
the first one explains that morality is a function of reason and it has to be
consistent. The second one is a combination of consequentialism (utilitarianism),
non-consequentialism (Kantian) and virtue of ethics.

In this chapter, Rachels basically characterizes a satisfactory moral theory.
He says that it cannot exaggerate the role of a human being in the world, it
encourages social living and cooperation between us, it makes space for care
and relationships we have with our loved ones, it recognizes that some people
need to be treated differently according to their own behavior and/or
decisions, it values different admirable motives and it combines reason and impartiality.

Rachels also talks about human welfare and according to him, it should
serve as a moral standard for any satisfactory moral theory. One of the
strategies is utilitarianism, where the goal is to maximize human welfare. This
theory also makes room for people to pursue their goals, interests, and
relationships that are specific and personal. It can include virtues, social
roles, duties, concerns, etc. all in order to maximize human welfare.

According to Rachels, everyone (people in all places and in all times)
should be  included in the community of
moral concern. He also includes the possibility that we include other animals
in our community of moral concern.

This reading was interesting to me because it talks about different
stuff that we discussed in class in one reading. I really like how Rachels
described the characteristics of a satisfactory moral theory because I agree
with most part of them. One thing that I agree is that we could include as a
possibility to include animals in our community of moral concern, but I mean
all animals, not only pets. Two questions that I would add to the reading for
the class would be: Is multiple-strategies utilitarianism extremely a
satisfactory moral theory? Why is human welfare central to any other moral