Sarbanes Oxley Act Of 2002 Accounting Essay

The intent of this study is to show the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, get downing from the history of self-regulation and its regulative organic structures, showing the administration dirts which triggered the Act ‘s creative activity, stressing the demands of Section 404 and reasoning on recent crises.The history of self-regulation in the United States is structured in two parts:( 1 ) Early Standards, including the Acts of 1933 and 1934, GAAS and GAAP, with short focal point on equal reappraisal, andAfter 70 old ages of self-regulation many accounting frauds, administration dirts and bankruptcies shacked the U.S. market. Due to their relevancy and impact on regulative criterions the instances of Enron and WorldCom were chosen to be discussed.After ordaining the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the U.S. Congress started a new epoch, by taking to implement a new independent organic structure ( PCAOB ) to supervise the auditing companies.

In relation with SOX the followerss were considered:( 1 ) SOX ‘s drumhead, with its aims and chief subdivisions,( 2 ) Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ( PCAOB ) , with its mission and implemented authorization.Next, the analysis focused on the subdivision 404 of SOX 2002 because is the proviso which caused the most violent treatments from executives ‘ portion. Due to the subdivision impact on companies ‘ fiscal statements the study includes a short presentation of its regulations with a larger analysis of execution costs and benefits.Still, even if the SOX and the SEC regulated the market in order to protect the investors and to avoid future corporate frauds, the fiscal crisis revealed new dirts, out of which in this study are mentioned:( 1 ) Bernard Madoff ‘s Ponzi strategy, and( 2 ) Bank of America Corporation ‘s deficiency of revelation related to Merrill Lynch amalgamation.Taking into consideration these dirts, alterations of ordinances must be considered for the hereafter and, possibly, reconsiderations of hearers ‘ function as direction strategic advisers.



1. Early Standards

In the United States, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the ordinances for accounting and scrutinizing were the same as United Kingdom ordinances due to the fact that the major American corporations were subdivisions of Britain companies ( Benston G. , et al. , 2006 ) . Still, the market experienced a low degree of ordinance ( or about absent ) , the wining events ( stock market clang in 1929 and depression from 1930 ) bespeaking a strong demand for modulating and unwraping policies to be established by the federal authorities.Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The historical foundation for ordinances of fiscal revelation by corporations is considered to be the minute when, instantly after the market clang from 1929, the U.S.

Congress enacted two major Torahs, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. For the first clip in history, those two regulations contained matter-of-fact commissariats sing corporate investors and fiscal revelation:“ Companies publically offering securities for investing dollars must state the populace the truth about their concerns, the securities they are selling, and the hazards involved in puting.Peoples who sell and trade securities – agents, traders, and exchanges – must handle investors reasonably and candidly, seting investors ‘ involvements foremost. ”[ 1 ]GAAS. Get downing with 1939, the first by and large accepted auditing criterions ( GAAS ) were drafted and adopted by the American Institute of Accountants ( presently AICPA ) , through its Auditing Standard Executive Committee ( AudSEC ) ( presently Auditing Standards Board ) . Because GAAS refers to put on the line appraisal and ways to extenuate them, three countries of commissariats were defined ( Benston G. , et al. , 2006 ) 🙁 1 ) general criterions – for finding the hearers ‘ personal traits ;( 2 ) fieldwork criterions – for puting the audit analysis, rating of internal controls and audit groundss ;( 3 ) coverage criterions – for measuring the revelations of fiscal statements and the audit sentiments, severally the application of GAAS to GAAP.

GAAP. Get downing with 1936-1938, the SEC entrusted the Committee on Accounting Procedure ( portion of AICPA ) to publish a private-sector accounting criterions in order to set-up an accounting system requested by the market needs. The first by and large accepted accounting rules ( GAAP ) were developed in its initial signifier of Accounting Research Bulletins ( ARB ) .Peer Review. In the early 1960s, the major confer withing accounting companies started to organize equal reappraisals for a better quality of “ accounting, scrutinizing and attestation services performed by AICPA members ”[ 2 ]. This means that every CPA house must be reviewed by another CPA house.

The latest company must independent from the reviewed company and must hold qualified experience.The supervising of the equal reappraisal activities is assured by the Public Oversight Board ( POB ) , an independent private sector organic structure[ 3 ], which, even if was created by SECPS members, is independent from the profession and the regulative procedure.

I.2. Regulatory Bodies

Securities and Exchange Commission ( SEC ) .

The US Congress, through Securities Exchange Act of 1934, established SEC as an independent bureau, holding as chief responsibility to “ specify proficient, trade, accounting, and other footings used ” in securities market, in the United States. The Commission is responsible for ( 1 ) construing federal securities Torahs ; ( 2 ) publishing new regulations and revising bing regulations ; ( 3 ) oversing the scrutiny of securities participants ( agents, investings advisors, other bureaus ) ; ( 4 ) monitoring private regulative organisations in the securities country ; and ( 5 ) following U.S.

securities regulations with other American and foreign governments[ 4 ].Presently, the SEC is administering the most of import Torahs that standardize the securities industry, Torahs which are: ( 1 ) Securities Act of 1933, ( 2 ) Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ( 3 ) Trust Indenture Act of 1939, ( 4 ) Investment Company Act of 1940, ( 5 ) Investing Advisers Act of 1940, ( 6 ) Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.The important power of SEC implies Torahs enforcement in instances of fraud, insider trading, and any other violations done by the persons and companies on the securities country.American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ( AICPA ) .

If all predating associations ( like the American Association of Public Accountants, the Institute of Public Accountants, the American Institute of Accountants ) are taken into consideration, than it can be stated that AICPA day of the months from 1887[ 5 ].Associating all the certified public comptrollers ( CPAs ) in the U.S. , the AICPA is the chief non-government important organic structure in developing auditing criterions ( including proficient regulations and ethical codifications ) and other regulation services for CPAs. Furthermore, it has the authorization to supervise and to implement the jurisprudence in instances of non-compliance with the criterions.Auditing Standards Board ( ASB ) .

Within AICPA, the ASB is assigned to be the commission in charge to really publish the criterions and the ordinances for CPAs, for non-public company audits, following to the necessary guidelines and the readings of the Torahs.Fiscal Accounting Standards Board ( FASB ) . Over clip, the mission to modulate the private sector by clear defined fiscal accounting criterions passed from AICPA ‘s Committee on Accounting Procedure to the Accounting Principles Board.

By the terminal of 1960s the market development triggered an increasing demand for accounting criterions updated in the same beat as the economical growing. As a consequence, since 1973, the Financial Accounting Standards Board has been created as a private, non-profit establishment, founded with the intent to “ set up and better criterions of fiscal accounting and coverage for the counsel and instruction of the populace, including issuers, hearers, and users of fiscal information. ”[ 6 ]

Corporate Administration: FAMOUS Scandals

In 2002, Ribstein L. argues in the Journal of Corporation Law that the traditional attack of corporate administration in big corporation must be established by authorities ordinance. This attack is based on premise that the stockholders, in order to protect their ownership ends, deficiency of tools to command the direction actions. On the other manus, admiting the stockholders ‘ failing, the directors are predisposed to take advantage of the state of affairs by moving on their ain personal involvements and power.Companies ‘ fiscal statements are the mean through which the directors can demo their part to the corporate overall growing. If in this judgement is included the fact that corporate direction normally has had compensation expressions strongly related with companies ‘ fiscal public presentation ( such as options on company ‘s portions ) , the direction inclination to pull strings companies ‘ fiscal statements becomes obvious, or, in other words, the direction is extremely interested “ to pull off net incomes ” ( Kaplan R.

, 2004 ) .After 70 old ages of corporate ordinance, in 2001 and 2002 series of direction frauds rocked the investors trust in the market. Scandals like Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, and Waste Management opened a new epoch of fiscal use. What is indispensable to be mentioned is the fact that all these frauds were possible despite all the degrees of supervising in topographic point, such as executive managers, external hearers, accounting houses, debt evaluation bureaus, or securities market analysts ( Ribstein L. , 2002 ) .

The most resonating dirt was Enron, which, after being one of the universe ‘s biggest power traders, revealed in October 2001 losingss higher than $ 70 billion in equity value. WorldCom, which played an of import function on telecommunication market, disclosed in March 2002 that its grosss are overstated by capitalising disbursals, losing $ 180 billion in stockholder equity. Both instances will be discussed in the undermentioned subdivision, stressing on deceitful operations and corporations failings.

II.1. Enron

Short sum-up:

Disclosure day of the month

October 2001


False increased net incomes, concealed liabilities numbering over $ 1 billion by utilizing off-the-books minutess.

Manipulation of the Californian energy market during the electricity crisis, entering “ entire net incomes of $ 2.7 billion from merchandising electricity and gas in western markets ” ( Markham J. , 2006 ) .Extorting and bet oning the power monetary values, every bit good as an overcharge of “ $ 175 million for electricity generated by Enron air current farms ” ( Markham J.

, 2006 ) .Securities fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, insider trading, and registering false income revenue enhancement returns ( for Enron ‘s executives ) .

Auditing house

Arthur AndersonWith losingss higher than $ 70 billion in equity value ( Bryce R. , 2002 ) , Enron dirt is one of the biggest political dirts in American history.In 1985, Enron started its concern as an of import bargainer on U.S. energy market, developing its operations within: minutess with natural gas, buildings of power installations and grapevines, telecommunications services, buying/selling trade goods.

Its rapid growing offered to the public media a esthesis of unstoppable grosss and solid fiscal stableness. Before the public revelation from 2001, the grosss and the incomes reported by Enron were impressive ( Markham J. , 2006 ) :in 1998 – $ 31 billion in gross and $ 703 million in net income after disbursals ;in 1999 – $ 40 billion in gross and $ 893 million in net income after disbursals ;in 2000 – $ 100 billion in gross and $ 979 million in net income after disbursals.In fact, the grosss were non existent, the fiscal image presented to the stockholders being an semblance.

In order to conceal its losingss Enron stretched the restrictions of accounting criterions and took advantage of all the regulative deficiencies.Due to its concern specificity, the accounting recording was disputing. First facet regarded the long-run contracts for which the current accounting regulations obliged the company to calculate the hereafter grosss. In this instance Enron ‘s income acknowledgment was made at present ( or carnival ) value, utilizing mark-to-market accounting, irrespective the prospective economic conditions.

The 2nd facet was linked with Enron ‘s trust on structured fiscal minutess and, implicitly, on particular purpose entities ( SPEs ) . In this country the accounting criterions were questionable, being debated by practicians because of the difference which could be created between existent economic state of affairs and companies ‘ fiscal indexs.Behind this “ radiance ” image, Enron built a web of derived functions merchandising and minutess with SPEs, which generated significant grosss non merely for the company itself, but besides for the company ‘s managers involved in the SPEs partnerships. The study of probe of the Enron Special Investigative Committee ( Powers W. , et al.

, 2002 ) mentioned the sums by which Enron ‘s employees were illegitimately enriched: “ aˆ¦Fastow ( i.e. Enron ‘s CFO ) by at least $ 30 million, Kopper ( i.

e. Enron ‘s finance executive ) by at least $ 10 millionaˆ¦ ” .In October 2001 Enron had to acknowledge disbursals of $ 1.01 billion after revenue enhancement and two months subsequently, Enron filed for bankruptcy. Enron ‘s failure is a clear illustration of corporate administration malfunction. Directors were compensated with stock options based on the company ‘s short-run public presentation with no other limitations, compensation plan that incentivized directors to increase the short-run public presentation regardless the long-run effects. Following to Enron ‘s direction, portion of the incrimination is assigned to external hearers ( Arthur Andersen ) and to parties responsible for the company ‘s internal administration ( see appendix 1 for a in writing representation of the links between Enron ‘s directors and investors ) .Analyzing the deductions of accounting regulations over the Enron ‘s dirt one statement must be made.

U.S. GAAP are really extended and, even more, stiff in its commissariats, animating fiscal professionals to happen originative accounting solutions to avoid the regulations.



Short sum-up:

Disclosure day of the month

March 2002


“ Use of unrevealed and improper accounting that materially overstated its income before income revenue enhancements and minority involvements by about $ 3.055 billion in 2001 and $ 797 million during the first one-fourth of 2002 ”[ 7 ]“ WorldCom ‘s transportation of its costs to its capital histories violated the established criterions of by and large accepted accounting rules ”[ 8 ]ensuing in $ 3.8 billion fraud.“ WorldCom violated the anti-fraud and coverage commissariats of the federal securities Torahs ”[ 9 ]WorldCom ‘s CEO Bernard Ebbers received from the company off-the-books loans of $ 408 million.

Auditing house

Arthur AndersonIn 1995 LDDC ( Long Distance Discount Company ) became WorldCom, one of the biggest telecommunication company on the U.S. market. Its CEO, Bernie Embers, joined the company in its early starts, in 1985.

During his disposal, the company experienced a period of high growing, with grosss making one million millions of dollars. In 1996, after the acquisition of MFS Communication Inc. , WorldCom became the 4th biggest telecommunication company ( Markham J. , 2006 ) , looking frontward to utilizing the chances offered by the new discovery inventions, such as fiber-optics and Internet.In October 1997 WorldCom announced the amalgamation with MCI Communications for $ 30 billion. The company continued to turn, describing net incomes of $ 16 billion ( Markham J. , 2006 ) between 1996 and 2000, even if the SEC obstructed the company from sing deductible big sums spend in research and development.In the early 2000, the full telecommunication industry started to decelerate down, and, besides, the stock monetary values were worsening.

The same happened in WorldCom ‘s instance. By the center of 2000, the stock monetary value was about half its 1999 monetary value. Even so, WorldCom announced surprising net incomes ( Markham J. , 2006 ) : $ 1.4 billion for 2001 and $ 130 million for the first one-fourth of 2002 ( when in fact the company recorded losingss ) . In March 2002, after an internal audit battle, WorldCom announced the restatement of its financials figures due to inappropriate accounting recordings of the grosss between get downing of 2001 and first one-fourth of 2002, grosss which were non in conformity with GGAP commissariats.In June 2002, the SEC charges WorldCom for $ 3.8 billion fraud[ 10 ].

As it was revealed by the SEC probe, WorldCom used an accounting ruse to capitalise its “ line costs ” ( e.g. fees paid by WorldCom to third party services suppliers ) and, in this manner, to maintain company ‘s net incomes at expected degrees.WorldCom filed for bankruptcy in July 2002, “ pass overing out $ 180 billion in stockholder equity ” ( Markham J. , 2006 ) . Ebbers was dismissed from the place of WorldCom ‘s CEO in April 2002[ 11 ]after acknowledging that he borrowed money from WorldCom in its effort to cover his losingss from purchasing WorldCom portions[ 12 ]. In 2005 Ebbers was sentenced to 25 old ages in gaol.

As presented by SEC ‘s WorldCom corporate proctor, Richard Breeden, in his study on the company ‘s steps to reconstruct its administration, “ WorldCom seemed to run into most of the administration criterions of its clip ” ( Breeden R. , 2003 ) . The company ‘s constellation included all the necessary constructions required for corporate administration ( such as audit commission, compensation commission etc.

) , with about 80 % of the managers carry throughing the independency demands. But, in fact, most of these “ mugwumps ” were really strong linked to Ebbers, through their incomes. So, corporate administration is non merely carry throughing a checklist with demands, but being profoundly concerned about the independency hindrances. In WorldCom ‘s instance the direction board failed to measure the company ‘s hazards and to pull disciplinary hazard processs. In Enron ‘s instance, the board allowed the CFO to take part in fiscal partnerships ( e.g. SPEs ) , seeking for his personal addition.In both instances, Enron and WorldCom, the CFOs failed to provide accurate fiscal informations.

Their fraud engagement was a existent obstruction for which the jobs were discovered excessively late.Difficult readings of GAAP ‘s commissariats sing net income and future net incomes every bit good as unrealistic hard currency flow statements were present besides in both companies. Furthermore, missing of an appropriate internal control system, the accommodations in the companies ‘ fiscal studies were easy to be made by the high degree employees.


The dirts of accounting fraud, corporate misbehaviours, non-compliance with concern moralss, and bankruptcies occurred in high-ranking companies like Enron and WorldCom revealed the market ‘s strong demand for deeper reforms in corporate ordinances.

In July 2002, the U.S. Congress ratified the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ( known besides as the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investors Protection Act of 2002 ) in response to the corporate crisis. One of the most of import legislative action since the Acts of 1933 and 1934, Sarbanes-Oxley has every bit aims to reconstruct the investors ‘ trust in the market and to heighten the transparence and morality of public companies, avoiding future similar allegations. Through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are addressed issues like direction ‘s legal liability, increased independency regulations for internal administration agents, compulsory internal control audits, and increased direction ‘s duty for fiscal coverage. Furthermore, Sarbanes-Oxley “ increases the SEC ‘s power to find that an person is unfit to function as an officer or manager of a publicly-traded company, even in the absence of a judicial determination of a misdemeanor of the federal securities Torahs ” ( Fisch J. , 2004 ) .

Beginning: Anand S. , 2007, Necessities of Sarbanes-Oxley, John Wiley & A ; Sons, Inc. , ISBN 978-0-470-05668-4, page 23.Stressing on the importance of concern codifications of moralss, in 2003, Harvard Law Review explained the Act ‘s commissariats related to self-policing as a effect of the general perceptual experience that these series of dirts and bankruptcies are non merely a failure of the ordinances, but a failure of direction behaviour.It was non plenty any longer to merely follow on formal managerial construction and independency demands. Both, Enron and WorldCom had direction boards that complied with independency criterions, but were non able to work expeditiously due to struggle of involvements and strong relationships with CEOs.

Furthermore, direction boards must be profoundly involved in companies ‘ concern and must understand the hazards, instead than merely stay independent ( Fisch J. , 2004 ) . Enron ‘s and WorldCom ‘s boards were far off from taking existent actions against CEOs/CFOs patterns or from responding in real-time to companies ‘ troubles.Sing the forms of fraud instances and the fact that CEOs and CFOs acted as primary cheats, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provinces, as chief proviso, the necessity to increase top-management ‘s duties for the consistence of companies ‘ fiscal statements.

IV.1. SOX ‘s sum-up

The Act demands must be perceived by the companies as a get downing point in constructing operational procedures, with an enhanced internal control system through full concern. Complying with SOX is non a erstwhile undertaking, but a uninterrupted betterment procedure, with executives traveling beyond conformity and concentrating on the quality of overall concern operations ( KPMG, 2004 ) .Beginning: KPMG, 2004, Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404: An Overview of the PCAOB ‘s Requirements, KPMG InternationalDespite the fact that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is structured in 11 different subdivisions, the jurisprudence itself must be understood as an overall, compact ordinance, and companies must seek for complete conformity. Still, the Act ‘s aims are more obvious in certain subdivisions, while other subdivisions are of import through their compliant troubles ( Anand S. , 2007 ) . The sum-up of the Act ‘s rubrics is presented in appendix 2.

Still, from the conformity point of position and relevancy for the two fraud instances antecedently presented, the most of import subdivisions of the Act[ 13 ]are:Section 302 – sing the corporate duty for fiscal studies ;In order to avoid lead oning fiscal statements Section 302 includes commissariats related to internal controls and the direction duty to measure the efficiency of these controls and to unwrap any lack which might hold a negative impact over the fiscal indexs.Section 401 – for “ Disclosures in Periodic Reports ” ;The fiscal statements must incorporate accurate information and must be issued to the public investors with a clear show in order to avoid any deceit or wrong statement. Besides, the minutess, particularly the liabilities, from off-balance sheet must be crystalline and presented in the coverage file.

Section 404 – is related with the direction compulsory rating and enfranchisement of companies ‘ internal control systems ;This subdivision raised many treatments, being one of the most controversial commissariats of the Act. The chief ground for these treatments was the character of this subdivision which implies the highest sum of resources and attempts to be spend in order to obtain SOX conformity.As stated by Section 404, in one-year fiscal statements, executive managers must declare their recognition of the duty for set uping, implementing and keeping the internal control system. The chief intent of this statement is to show the investors the internal controls construction and to guarantee them about its efficiency.Section 409 – saying the necessity of real-time revelations when of import alterations are made in companies ‘ fiscal indexs during the periods between quarterly studies.Without this subdivision the investors would hold to establish their determinations on disused statements.

Unlike Section 404, this subdivision did n’t implied heavy resource allotment.

IV.2. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ( PCAOB )

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act created the PCAOB, a private-sector, non-profit-making corporation, holding as mission “ to supervise the hearers of public companies in order toA protect investors and the public involvement by advancing enlightening, just, and independent audit studies ”[ 14 ]By making the PCAOB, the self-acting theoretical account of accounting industry was no longer valid, the duty and authorization of making criterions and implementing audits for public companies being transferred from the profession side ( AICPA ) to an independent party ( PCAOB ) . Through its commissariats, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act obliged, for the first clip in modulating history, the hearers of public companies to be overseen by external and independent parties.

The SEC maintained its important power over the PCAOB, by calling the regulating board and by amending the organisation ‘s bylaws, criterions and budgets[ 15 ].



Section 404 Rules

As stated by the SOX Section 404, there are a set of regulations for direction to follow in measuring the internal controls construction within the company. The wide definition of the term “ internal control ” refers to all the countries within an organisation ‘s concern, but inside SOX ‘s nomenclature, the “ internal control ” term is used purely for specifying the internal control over fiscal coverage.First of wholly, the direction is responsible for making the internal controls construction, in conformity with his concern procedures. An of import facet must be clarified here.

Neither internal hearers, nor external hearers are in charge with developing the internal control keys. The company ‘s CEO and the top-management squad must take this duty and act in conformity as a whole. Furthermore, it is non plenty merely to make the system, but to sporadically update it in order to maintain up with the concern altering beat.

The appraisal of internal controls must be made with a recognized model. In the U.S. most companies uses COSO model ( the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission model ) , or COBIT model ( the Control Objectives for Information and related Technology model ) .

( We will non discourse these models in this study. )The internal controls assessment must be performed yearly, at the year-end.The external audit company must non reevaluate the internal control system, but execute an audit in relation with the direction ‘s assessment. In other words, the external audit must non remake the full internal control construction appraisal, but merely to trust on the direction ‘s public presentation sing the internal control assessment.Even so, senior direction must obtain the full assurance that its appraisal presents a true landscape of the internal control system, as of the year-end, with comfy confidence that any material misstatement can be avoided or identified ( The Institute of Internal Auditors, 2008 ) .


Consequences of Implementing Section 404

Costss of implementing SOX 404. By and large talking, the costs derived from internal controls execution and testing can be easy identified as payments for audit and conformity employees, clip spent by operational employees and external audit fees. Still, in the first twelvemonth of conformity, overall attempts were overpowering due to work sum needed to be done, work which included analysing certification, verifying histories ‘ balances, monitoring and evaluating controls keys public presentation and efficiency, set uping coverage construction. One of import ground for which conformity procedure was so complex was the fact that a major portion of the control keys were done manually, with really much time-consuming, and merely a little portion of control keys were IT-based.

Following to these costs, Langevoort D. ( 2006 ) references “ the chance costs and the distractions ” , mentioning to the fact that some audit trials require direct observation of operations ( e.g.

hard currency processing ) and accounts from in-charge forces or director. He is traveling even further by saying that direct control can make uncomfortableness to employees which will impact the sense of trust and diminish the employees ‘ trueness.As mentioned before, the conformity with Section 404 turned out to be the most expensive portion of the full Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In August 2004, the Financial Executives Institute revealed a survey of 224 companies which indicated costs up to $ 3 million for the biggest companies ( Rittenberg L. , Miller P. , 2005 ) . Even more, in an article from BusinessWeek, William Zollars, president and CEO of Yellow Roadway, the U.

S. largest hauling house, explained that his company paid about $ 9 million to comptrollers for their work, sum which represented 3 % of one-year net incomes for 2004[ 16 ].After first twelvemonth of SOX execution, an analysis carried out by the PCAOB concluded that the costs for conformity were high because, in many instances, excessively many audit trials were performed and documented by hearers, companies passing excessively much clip on internal controls related to fiscal coverage procedures ( O’Brien P. , 2006 ) .Still, as presented in the left manus image, in January 2005, harmonizing to a study developed by the Institute of Internal Auditors, 72 % of respondents considered that the costs are higher than the benefits for SOX 404 first twelvemonth of execution.After six old ages of SOX conformity, in August 2008, Dodwell W. argues, in an article in the CPA Journal, that initial execution disbursals made by companies are paying off. Following to the costs presented supra, the cost-benefit analysis should besides see:“ concentrated stock ownership ” because companies avoid traveling populace ;“ lessened fight in capital elevation and concern investing ” due to companies development overseas alternatively of puting in U.

S. ( they are seeking to avoid SOX demands ) ;redundancy which may look between direction ‘s work and external hearer ‘s analysis.Benefits from following with SOX 404. In balance with the high costs and resources used for implementing conformity with the SOX Section 404, companies realized that benefits are non ignorable at all.

Companies ‘ profiles evolved, going aware of its corporate administration within all operational countries. Understanding better the functionality of internal controls companies developed valuable methodological analysiss to measure cardinal controls and to early identify lacks.Auditing companies ( such as KMPG and PWC ) considered that investors are the chief donees from the SOX 404 execution due to enhanced unity and transparence of the fiscal statements ( KPMG, 2005 ) .Quall J.

( 2004 ) argued in an article in The CPA Journal that the chief benefits for implementing SOX 404 could be:( 1 ) “ preparation, educating, and development of forces ” , in order to be able to understand the new control demands and to better their efficiency ;( 2 ) “ bettering the efficiency of the company ” . Documenting their concern processes companies became cognizant of excess activities, and could cut down costs ;( 3 ) “ upgrading board of managers and audit commission members ” with fiscal experts as board members ;( 4 ) other benefits such as uncovering concealed frauds.Overall, gauging the benefits of implementing SOX demands is much more hard than accounting costs. The general sentiment is that, with SOX, companies have prevented many frauds and jobs. Other benefits could be increased clip for direction to concentrate on scheme and concern development, alternatively of deciding crises generated by frauds and grosss restatements ( Beilard J.

et al. , 2007 ) .


If we take a expression to the latest accounting dirts, market falls, and fallacious strategies, we could oppugn the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ability to achieve its chief aim, severally to protect investors by forestalling corporate fraud.The most representative instance is Bernard Madoff ‘s fraud who managed to develop the biggest Wall Street Ponzi strategy in history, with losingss of $ 18 billion[ 17 ]for his investors. In March 2009, Madoff pleaded guilty to 11 counts of fraud, bearing false witness, and money laundering for a reported sum of $ 65 billion ( Roybark H. , 2009 ) .Despite elaborate demands of SOX and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Madoff ‘s hearer, “ Friehling & A ; Horowitz, CPAs ” , has ne’er been obliged to register to the SEC. Furthermore, due to breaches in regulation criterions and even if was enrolled in the AICPA ‘s equal plan, this scrutinizing house has ne’er been submitted to the equal reappraisal or to the PCAOB ‘s review ( Roybark H.

, 2009 ) .Another recent instance, which is non straight linked to the SOX, but is representative for revelation issues, is SEC v. Bank of America sing the amalgamation with Merrill Lynch & A ; Co. Firstly, the SEC charged Bank of America for “ doing materially false and deceptive statements in the joint placeholder statements ” , for the $ 50 billion Merrill acquisition on January 2009[ 18 ]. The SEC charged the Bank of America for paying year-end fillips of up to $ 5.8 billion to Merrill Lynch employees prior to amalgamation shutting, without bank ‘s stockholders ‘ blessing.

Second, the SEC charged the Bank of America for accepting the fillips payment when, in fact, Merrill recorded loss of $ 27.6 billion in 2008. For both actions Bank of America failed to “ adequately unwrap material information to its stockholders ” before the meeting to O.

K. amalgamation with Merrill Lynch & A ; Co.Market ‘s conditions are continuously altering. More and more, companies are constrained to confront fiscal crises.

In these conditions SOX and other accounting/auditing criterions must accommodate in order to be in resonance with overall economic development. Possibly it ‘s clip for audit squads to travel behind conformity and to concentrate more on back uping executive boards ‘ schemes, being profoundly involved in amalgamations and acquisition tactics, placing and supervising new classs of hazards. Or maybe it ‘s clip to take the CEOs non purely on their fiscal expertness, but on their personal verticalness and unity.


Appendix 1 – Enron: The Links between Managers and Investors

Beginning: Healy P. , Palepu K.

, 2003, The Fall of Enron, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 17, Number 2, Pages 3-26..

Appendix 2 – The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Sections[ 19 ]

Title I. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. This subdivision designed the PCAOB construction, with its rights and legal powers.Title II. Auditor Independence. The subdivision is focused on modulating hearers ‘ activities.

The commissariats are related with the bar of struggle of involvements, the hearers ‘ rotary motion and the interdiction period to fall in an audited company.Title III. Corporate Responsibility. This subdivision requires the foundation of an independent audit commission and the CEOs ‘ and CFOs ‘ enfranchisement sing the truth and unity of the companies ‘ fiscal statements.

Title IV. Enhanced Financial Disclosures. It states the duty of unwraping all material fiscal minutess, including accounting accommodations and off-balance recordings. Besides, requires more transparence in the direction personal fiscal minutess.Title V. Analyst Conflicts of Interest. This subdivision is dedicated to protecting the securities analysts.

Title VI. Commission Resources and Authority. It refers to the SEC ‘s power and its capacity to supervise the activities of audit houses.Title VII.

Surveies and Reports. It includes the mandate to publish SOX conformity studies sing public accounting companies, recognition ranking bureaus and investing Bankss.Title VIII.

Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability. This subdivision contains commissariats for condemnable punishments and frauds, for whistle blowers ‘ protection and for penalties for victimizing stockholders.Title IX. White-collar Crime Punishment Enhancements. Punishments for mail and wire frauds are included, following to punishments for go againsting the Employees Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.

Furthermore, this subdivision presents the directors ‘ punishments for non attesting the truth and dependability of their companies ‘ fiscal studies or for neglecting in following with SOX demands.Title X. Corporate Tax Returns. It contains the demand that the CEO must O.

K. the federal income revenue enhancement return.Title XI. Corporate Fraud and Accountability. This subdivision provides power to the SEC to look into fraud and to make up one’s mind on punishments for misdemeanors of the Securities Exchange Act.

Besides, it includes interdictions for individuals antecedently convicted of fraud from carry throughing executive place.

Appendix 3 – Section 404 Content ( an extract from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act[ 20 ])

“ SEC. 404.


( a ) RULES REQUIRED.-The Commission shall order regulations necessitating each one-year study required by subdivision 13 ( a ) or 15 ( vitamin D ) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ( 15 U.S.

C. 78m or 78o ( vitamin D ) ) to incorporate an internal control study, which shall-( 1 ) province the duty of direction for set uping and keeping an equal internal control construction and processs for fiscal coverage ; and( 2 ) contain an appraisal, as of the terminal of the most recent financial twelvemonth of the issuer, of the effectivity of the internal control construction and processs of the issuer for fiscal coverage.( B ) INTERNAL CONTROL EVALUATION AND REPORTING.-With regard to the internal control appraisal required by subdivision ( a ) , each registered public accounting house that prepares or issues the audit study for the issuer shall certify to, and study on, the appraisal made by the direction of the issuer.

An attestation made under this subdivision shall be made in conformity with criterions for attestation battles issued or adopted by the Board. Any such attestation shall non be the topic of a separate battle. ”


AcSECAccounting Standards Executive CommitteeAICPAAmerican Institute of CPAsAPBAccounting Principles BoardASBAuditing Standards BoardAudSECAuditing Standard Executive CommitteeCapCommittee on Accounting ProcedureCertified public accountantCertified Public AccountantCPEContinuing Professional EducationFAFFiscal Accounting FoundationFASBFiscal Accounting Standard BoardGenerally accepted accounting principlesBy and large Accepted Accounting PrinciplesGAASBy and large Accepted Auditing StandardsPEECProfessional Ethics Executive CommitteePost-office boxPublic Oversight BoardQCICQuality Control Inquiry CommitteeSECSecurities and Exchange CommissionSECPSSEC Practice Section